

ROLE OF TLP IN POLITICS OF PAKISTAN : A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

1. **Neelam Nisa**

neelamnisa280@gmail.com

Mphil Pakistan Studies, Department,
Abbottabad University of Science and
Technology, Abbottabad.

2. **Jalil Faraz**

jalilfaraz786@gmail.com

Mphil Pakistan Studies, Department of
Pakistan Studies Abbottabad University of
Science & Technology, KPK.

3. **Javed Ihsan**

jj9372371@gmail.com

Mphil Pakistan Studies, Department of
Pakistan Studies Abbottabad University of
Science & Technology, KPK.

Vol. 01, Issue, 01, July-Dec 2024, PP:50-64

OPEN ACCES at: www.mirpurislamicus.com

Article History	Received	Accepted	Published
	18-09-24	18-10-24	30-12-24

Abstract

The evolution and political activism of the Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), a religio-political institution, from a protest movement to a political birthday celebration, while retaining its man or woman as a movement, are examined in this study. As a result, TLP features a hybrid structure in which the lines between movement and birthday celebration are blurred. TLP has pushed itself in Pakistan's political spiritual arena in recent years by defending the reasons of Khatam-e-Nabuwat (the finality of Muhammad's prophethood) and Namooos-e-Risalat (honour of the Prophet Muhammad). TLP, as a movement, uses rallies and agitation to affect the political agenda, while also using political processes to demand or obstruct policies deemed harmful to its non-secular activities. As it was a common course of action even before the emergence of this party that religion has always been used as a tool in the politics of Pakistan. So, TLP emerged as a result of 9/11 religion-political events in Pakistan and shifting patterns of country sponsorship towards spiritual groupings. TLP leader Khadim Hussain Rizvi's (late) framing of Brelvi's issues in opposition to his rival enterprises reveals the institution's discriminatory and sectarian politics. In the safety of Prophet Muhammad's honor, Khadim Hussain Rizvi offers redemption to his followers. This study discusses the historical perspective of TLP,

the role of religious leaders, and the contemporary situation.

Keywords: *Brelvi politics, Sufism, blasphemy laws, Pakistan, social actions, sectarianism, identity politics.*

INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years, Pakistan's Brelvi's movement, an outgrowth of India's nineteenth-century Sufi heritage, has been politically and religiously active. The assassination of former Punjab governor Salman Taseer in 2011 and the arrest of his killer Mumtaz Qadri in 2016 have radicalized portions of Pakistan's Brelvi's movement on the hotly debated and contentious topic of blasphemy. Brelvis in Pakistan are regarded as a soft face of Islam and an antidote to religious bigotry due to their perceived tolerant and inclusive attitude. Tahreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), which has received support from some elements of Pakistan's Brelvi network, primarily lower-middle-class youth. The social motion theory (SMT) is used in this study to examine TLP's emergence by following its evolution from a movement to a political celebration while keeping its persona as a movement and its impact on Brelvi politics in Pakistan. This observation places TLP in Pakistan's non-secular-political environment, demonstrating that, while TLP's political activism and ideological narratives are exclusive and sectarian, the trajectory of its normal evolution is consistent with other spiritual companies in Pakistan. The shifting patterns of state patronage in Pakistan towards non-sectarian organizations (from Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith to Brelvi), renewed sectarian struggles among competing Islamist organizations for status and strength, and the post-September 11 environment have all contributed to the emergence and evolution of TLP. This examination also examines TLP's transition from a movement to a festival, as well as its hardline politics and religious activism. Their examination of TLP's rise and progress adds to our understanding of spiritual political actors' hybrid approach to Islamist politics in Pakistan, both as actions and parties. It also increases our understanding of how new religious firms with sufficient avenue power may behave when the nation, intentionally or unintentionally, opposes their communal endeavors. This observation examines TLP's politics and activities between 2011 and 2018 using YouTube videos, online literature, and the 20 factors electoral manifesto. Furthermore, relevant book chapters and magazine articles were used to provide the history of the Brelvi movement and its basic ideas, particularly in relation to the rival Deobandi movement. Extra details have been collected from media reports and the 2017 Supreme Court (SC) judgement in the Faizabad sit-in-so-moto case. Furthermore, observations were gathered from TLP political events in Liaquat Bagh and a sit-in in Faizabad, Rawalpindi in 2017 to recognize the party's expanded membership.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In response to the reformist Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith movements, the Brelvi's movement formed in the Indian subcontinent in the late nineteenth century. The movement takes its name from Ahmed Raza Khan Brelvi's ancestral city of Bareilly. It is also known as Ahl-e-Sunnah Wal Jamaat (Sunnah and Community Adherents) and belongs to the Hanafi school of thought, a sub-branch of Sunni Islam. The basic beliefs of the Brelvi's movement include Prophet Muhammad's pre-birth life, his introduction from God's light (Nur), his simultaneous presence in multiple locations (Hazer-o-Nazir), and knowledge of the unseen (Elm-e-Ghaib). Brelvi's also

emphasized the veneration of Sufi saints, their devotional practices, and shrine worship. Furthermore, they celebrate Prophet Muhammad's birthday (Milad) and the death anniversaries (Urs) of Sufi Saints, whom they remember as intercessions to God. Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith identify Brelvi as innovators (Bidaati) and deviants (Murtad) because of these ideals. Meanwhile, Brelvi refers to Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith, who are inspired by the Salafist movement in the Middle East who approach Islam seriously, as Nadjis, a disparaging name for Wahabis and blasphemers (Gustakh-e-Rasool). Brelvis accuses Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith of radicalizing Sufi Islam by attracting Saudi finance and increasing Wahabi influence in Pakistan. Unlike Deobandis, Brelvis played an active role in Pakistan's establishment and supported the All-India Muslim League (AIML). The All-India Sunni Council supported the AIML's doctrine of distinct nationhood for Hindus and Muslims over Deobandi Jami at Ulama-e-Hind (JUH), which advocated united nationhood and was affiliated with the Indian National Congress. Following the passage of the Pakistan decision in Lahore in 1940, a dissident faction of Deobandi Ulema led by Allamah Shabbir Ahmed Usmani split from the JUH and supported the AIML. Following the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, the Brelvi Jami at Ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP) was pushed out of the political arena by the more active Deobandi Jami at Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Deobandis also led the anti-Ahmadi movement in Pakistan in the 1950s, which Brelvis joined reluctantly and late.

Despite the fact that JI's Maulana Maududi and Deobandi scholar Maulana Abul Hasan Nadwi were at the forefront of the anti-Ahmadi movement in the Seventies, the party suffered internal divisions, and Brelvis remained on the margins of Pakistan's mainstream politics. Brelvi marginalization increased further during Zia-ul-Haq's military administration (1977-1988), when Deobandi militant groups were supported by the state to confront Iran-sponsored Shia agitation in Pakistan and conduct proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Throughout this period, the number of Deobandi madrassas serving as jihadist recruiting and training centers steadily increased, eventually outnumbering Brelvi madrassas throughout Pakistan. In 1988, there were around 1,840 registered Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan, compared to 717 registered Brelvi madrassas. Deobandis also established political networks in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Baluchistan (SW). Furthermore, graduates of Deobandi madrassas held the majority of positions at government and navy-run mosques. Furthermore, the Islamic Ideology Council, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and provincial textual content boards all had a strong Deobandi presence. Deobandi clerics were also preferred for teaching Arabic and Islamic courses in government-run schools. Pakistan is a multi-ethnic, religiously diverse, and politically polarized society. In Pakistan, Islam has a large role in both the public and private realms. Since the 1980s, the supremacy of the Sunni-Shia struggle and, more recently, intra-Sunni cleavages have left young people confused between their religious and national identities. Following 9-11, the breadth of Deobandi-Brelvi theological and political differences expanded further, giving way to 'mobilization essentially based on identification endorsing a political function.' TLP has used Sufism for political and social mobilization against Deobandis in order to maintain Brelvis' rights and interests.

This is a 'competition in piety' in which Brelvis are attempting to outbid

Deobandis by promoting, safeguarding, and preserving spiritual principles in Pakistan. Deobandis were accused of distorting Islam's nonviolent teachings through Talibanization and militarism. The Brelvi's move represents half of Pakistan's population, making it huge and diversified. Despite TLP's outstanding electoral record, numerous Brelvi corporations and events oppose its hardline politics. For example, Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri's Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) disagreed with TLP over the latter's agitational style to politics and rigid stance on blasphemy law norms. PAT believes that the blasphemy laws can be changed to close the procedural gaps that have been exploited by a few people to falsely accuse their opponents of blasphemy. TLP strongly opposes any changes to those laws, viewing them as anti-Islamic and an attack on the Prophet Muhammad's honour. Sunni Tehreek (ST) and Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat (JAS) both separated themselves from TLP in 2019. The TLP has internal schisms, as evidenced by a TLP section led by Asif Ashraf Jalali defecting from Rizvi while the latter unilaterally called off the Faizabad sit-in without contacting the former. Following the arrest of Rizvi and his patron-in-chief, Pir Afzal Qadri, there was a major desertion of mid-level TLP personnel in 2019. Police apprehended the pair in Lahore after they threatened to spark national protests following the acquittal of Asia Bibi, a Christian woman wrongfully accused of blasphemy, by the Supreme Court.

THE CRITICAL FRAMEWORK

The SMT frameworks of birthday celebration-movement typology, body Alignment and charismatic management are beneficial for the evolution of knowledge TLP and political action. Social activities are 'escapist coping mechanisms,' emerging when states forget about suppressed companies' problems and institutions fail to alleviate their sense of alienation. Political events, civil society organizations and protest acts are all examples of social actions. In a few circumstances, the boundaries between or among the above-mentioned kinds can be blurry and permeable, resulting in hybrid formulations. When new spiritual movements enter public life, they engage with the political system in novel ways. Some gain notoriety, while others fade away. The behaviors that feel minor and unnoticed broaden a communal attention on their prejudice and isolation. They direct the machine entirely on specific social, political, or spiritual issues, while providing their activists and supporters with a sense of belonging, rationality, and popularity. Religious movements have the potential to both aid and oppose the status quo. They maintain the status quo while engaging in non-secular activities. Legitimacy is not in doubt. When their interests are at stake, they threaten the status quo with varied degrees of violence. Some non-secular firms enter the political arena while keeping their man or woman as moves, blurring the distinctions between moves and events. Both movements and political events contribute to the articulation and depiction of political interests. Events can be less or more linked, and movements can be more or less institutionalized. The moves sharpen the agendas, while the parties sell them. Events, such as gaining access to more resources and opportunities, are important in carrying out political activities; nonetheless, the motivation comes from the acts. As an alternative, party-actions can be defined as a "coalition of activists who emerge from social actions and attempt to apply the organizational and strategic practices of the social motion into the political arena." Celebration-moves are 'opposition parties that unite with social society firms

and use their organizational assets to interact intimately in protests.' Mink Enberg goes on to say that the birthday party-moves attempt to be both inside and outside of the system while engaging in controversial politics. They are preoccupied with continual, rather than episodic, fights with their adversaries. On the one hand, parties enter the political arena to provide a proper assessment of the problem and body the valuable topic in conflict with other individuals. On the other hand, activities increase a given problem in the broader public by increasing debate and calling the public's attention to the issue at hand. Birthday party movements desire three key elements to frame their narratives. According to Wiktorowicz (2002), an effective narrative frame the grievances and needs of the oppressed in a way that also proposes an answer, particularly diagnostic framing-identification of the problem and its critique, prognostic framing-presenting an answer, and motivation framing-mobilization techniques that encourage humans to take action to remedy the problem. Positive symbols, photos, concepts, and arguments are used in the narratives to focus on the motivation of the birthday party-actions. At some point in the narrative's development, the frames catch the sensation of victimhood, discern needs, and become aware of the combatants of celebration-movements, which is critical to learning their identity. The charismatic leadership is also essential for the success of celebration-movements. A charismatic leader draws large crowds, quickly engages with activists, and supports the movement's goal. Furthermore, he should be able to explain the supporters' desires and objectives coherently and instill confidence in them. Finally, social media allows celebration movements to voice their minds unexpectedly and broadcast their narratives without censorship, even if they are censored in conventional media. Modern celebration-moves establish online communities of followers and supporters to keep in touch with them and inform them of current events. Social media structures increase the exposure of celebration activities, foster social bonds, and serve as coherent marketers.

TLP AS CELEBRATION-MOVEMENT

TLP's active activism and politics in the Brelvi political arena notwithstanding, its normal change from a movement to a celebration, while keeping the former, is consistent with the evolution of Pakistan's various non-secular-political players. Despite entering the political arena, JI in Pakistan has remained a movement through its social work, scientific services, and educational activities. Similarly, the mainstream Japanese Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and Hamas have entered politics while continuing their activities on the ground as moves. Non-secular political events have always performed poorly in Pakistan's electoral politics. Only on activities have spiritual-political parties succeeded in forming provincial governments in Pakistan; in 1972, the JUI under Mufti Mehmood established the authorities in KP, and in the 2002 election, the Mottahedeh Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a six-birthday party spiritual alliance, under Qazi Hussain Ahmed established the governments in KP and Baluchistan. As a result, non-secular-political players in Pakistan maintain their informal influence as actions to exert professional avenue pressure on governments to accommodate their spiritual wants. TLP has developed from a movement to a celebration since its inception, while preserving the former on two levels. TLP began as a motion, namely Tehreek Rihai Mumtaz Qadri (movement to release Mumtaz Qadri). Following his election in 2016, the movement was renamed Tehreek-e-Labaik

Ya Rasulallah (TLYRA), which then evolved into a political partisan party known as TLP. TLP agitated, occupied squares, and organized sit-ins during the first phase to informally articulate the Brelvi community's sense of isolation and call attention to its problems. In the second portion, it changed into a political birthday celebration in order to formally carry its demands into the political arena. TLP offered the translation of its worldview while framing the valuable issue (Khatam-e-Nabuwat) in struggle with competitor sects, mainly Deobandis, in the political domain.

Within the strategy, it has demonstrated charismatic management traits, which run the celebration in an authoritative manner and provide birthday celebration organizational balance. According to Mink Enberg's views, TLP is normally concerned with competition creation as well as a continual and not episodic fight with its adversaries. TLP is well-known for its agitational activism and oppositional politics, as it is always inside and outside of the system. Significantly, the TLP not only opposes Deobandis, but within the Brelvi network, its emphasis on exclusion is aimed at portraying itself as superior to other Brelvi political groups that have formed alliances with other spiritual organizations such as the MMA and other mainstream political parties in Pakistan. While the TLP believes that its political demands are not being satisfied, it takes to the streets to put pressure on the government. TLP's protests against Asia Bibi's, a Christian lady wrongly accused of blasphemy, launch by invoking SC in October 2018 are an example in point. TLP supports initiatives to enhance blasphemy laws while opposing pro-minority policies in the political realm. For example, the TLP's election manifesto favors the death penalty for all and everyone while also proposing changes to Pakistan's blasphemy laws. TLP draws its grassroots leaders from the Brelvi community's lower-middle-elegance young people, who have access to social media. These lower-middle-elegance younger Brelvis are victims of Pakistan's polarized political milieu and are vulnerable to vigilantism and violence. TLP has targeted this demographic segment of the Brelvi network by exposing them to a restricted and sectarian approach to political activism. The TLP's violent activism and politics stem from its chief Rizvi's explicit incitement to unrest. As previously stated, the majority of TLP's support base consists of impressionable teens from the lower-middle class. They express their rage and dissatisfaction by trashing private and government buildings, attacking automobiles, torching tyres, and blocking major highways whenever the TLP's management announces a protest name. Socioeconomic grievances combined with non-secular zealotry create a combustible mix. Looking back, the failure of other Brelvi organizations, aside from ST, to achieve their political goals and preserve communal interests through peaceful activism was also a motivator for TLP to embrace an agitational activist strategy.

EMPIRICAL ELEMENTS OF TLP'S RISE AND EVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN, POST-9/11 BARELVI-DEOBANDI CONFRONTATION

Brelvi's post-independence marginalization and disenfranchisement was outright estrangement and lack of confidence after September 11 as a result of the state's disinterest and developing Deobandi militant assaults. Brelvis became acutely aware of their identity and non-secular interests as a result of their fear. As stated in the framework, when states ignore or fail to address the grievances and aspirations of social, political, or spiritual groups, it creates the path for the initiation of new

actions. The new actions can take multiple paths and formulations, as well as hybridized structures. Following 9/11, attacks by Deobandi militant organizations, including the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), on Brelvi shrines, mosques, and students increased. almost all foremost Sufi Shrines such as Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Karachi, records Darbar in Lahore, Imam Bari and Golra Sharif in Islamabad, Sakhi Sarwar in Dera Ghazi Khan and Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan Sharif had been attacked, even though the ST resisted towards Deobandi encroachments in social and political areas, it turned into mostly constrained to the towns of Karachi and Hyderabad, in Sindh. Similarly, Brelvi students have been attacked for issuing fatwas (edicts) opposing terrorism in Pakistan, denouncing Talibanization and supporting the country's counter-extremism initiatives. Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri was Pakistan's first Brelvi student to issue a 500-page fatwa against suicide terrorism. Brelvi and Sufi organizations also lead attempts to organize meetings and seminars against extremism and to promote a tolerant and peaceful message of Sufi Islam in Pakistan. Furthermore, during the Milad festivities in 2006, LeJ dismissed the whole administration of ST in Nishtar Park, Karachi. In addition, Allamah Sarfraz Naemi, a Brelvi student, was slain by TTP in Lahore in 2009 for openly opposing the organization and its radical mission. During this time, Deobandis also occupied numerous mosques affiliated with the Brelvi network in remote areas of Pakistan, particularly Karachi, usually resulting in violent clashes. Following the data Darbar incident in 2010, a group of Brelvi elders met with then-Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif to discuss justice for the victims. However, the PML-N authorities did nothing because it was politically aligned with Deobandi enterprises. nation patronage styles are being transformed. The 2007 Red Mosque revolt and the 2014 attack on the military public college in Peshawar caused the country to reassess its support for Deobandi enterprises; as a result, Sufi and Brelvi businesses were strengthened as a counter-weight to Deobandi extremism and militarism. However, this was done without properly analyzing the risk of elevating one sectarian group over another in a religiously diverse society like Pakistan.

In any case, Sufism was portrayed as Islam's compassionate, inventive, and enlightened approach. As a result, Sufi and Brelvi enterprises were granted space, money, and mechanisms were required to promote Sufi Islam and provide spiritual support to the country's counterterrorism and counterretaliation efforts. For instance, in 2009, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) authorities rebuilt and renamed the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism, which had been established by President Musharraf in 2006. A council committee of seven members was also formed, which became dominated by the Brelvi-JUP. The PPP government also pushed Brelvi political groupings, ST, and the Sunni Etihad Council (SIC) on the national stage. However, circumstances took a negative turn in 2011 when Taseer was murdered by his police bodyguard Mumtaz Qadri, a lower-middle-class devout Brelvi child, for criticizing blasphemy laws, and Asia Bibi was sentenced to death by courts on blasphemy charges. Taseer paid a visit to Bibi in jail and pledged to present her clemency petition to then-President Asif Ali Zardari. Taseer also advocated for changes to blasphemy laws in order to prevent their abuse. Taseer's opinions infuriated the Brelvi community, which rallied in support of blasphemy legislation standards and against Taseer. Brelvi clerics charged Taseer with blasphemy (for

criticizing blasphemy legal rules) and declared him *Wajib-ul-Qatal* (deserving of death). Following Taseer's assassination, over 500 Brelvi religious students published a fatwa hailing Qadri as a hero and urging people to skip Taseer's burial rites. The *Jamaat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnah*, Pakistan's most powerful Brelvi organization, warned that 'no Muslim should attend the funeral or even attempt to pray for Taseer or exhibit any sort of remorse or sympathy over the incident.' Taseer's assassination put an end to the PPP-Brelvi friendship.

MUMTAZ QADRI'S PLACING AND THE RISE OF TLP AS A MOVEMENT

TLP rose as a result of the time between Taseer's assassination and Qadri's detention. As stated in the framework, oppressed spiritual groups build a collective identification of their complaints and use the technique largely based on specific political or spiritual issues. TLP positioned itself as the self-appointed mother or parent of Prophet Muhammad's honor (*Hurmat-e-Rasool*) and keeper of blasphemy law rules, using Qadri as a non-secular image to gain political value. Blasphemy laws enacted by means of fashionable Zia ul Haq in 1984 made desecration of important religions, including blasphemy of Prophet Muhammad, punishable by death. Since then, particular Islamist organizations have utilized these laws to support their exclusionary policies towards Ahmadis and other non-secular minorities in Pakistan. TLP, on the other hand, aimed to refashion blasphemy activism as its one-of-a-kind sector. When you consider that Rizvi organized many public rallies in support of blasphemy legal rules in 2011, he got the moniker 'blasphemy activist.' TLP did this on purpose, not only to antagonize Deobandis, but also to distinguish itself from other Brelvi agencies open to coalitions with other religious-political events in Pakistan. TLP leaders have promised to defend blasphemy laws with their life. The party has said in its electoral manifesto that anyone who proposes changes to those laws will face the death sentence. TLP leaders have not only chastised the authorities for attempting to soften blasphemy laws, but have also chastised Deobandi clerics such as Maulana Tariq Jameel and Maulana Fazlur Rehman for not protesting and speaking out against the proposed amendments to the 2017 Election Bill. TLP, as a movement, has so participated in agitational politics, mass protests, and rallies.

In 2016, an estimated 2,000 TLP protestors infiltrated Islamabad's purple-area region and staged a sit-in at Qadri's chillum (ritual held on the forty-first day of the demise for prayers). They requested that the government, among other things, declare Qadri a hero, convert his prison cell into a national background website, dismiss Ahmadi network contributors from government employment, and apprehend Asia Bibi. The sit-in came to an end after negotiations between the administration and the TLP. This marked the beginning of the TLP's agitational political era. TLP conducted another sit-in in November 2017 by blocking the main toll road between Rawalpindi and Islamabad over modifications in oath-wording made by legislators and the electorate. The wording of the oath was changed in Election Bill 2017 from 'I solemnly swear' to 'I declare.' Despite the fact that this provision was repealed, the TLP requested the resignation of then-law Minister Zahid Hamid. Following the failure of the police to remove TLP demonstrators, the authorities requested aid from the Pakistan navy. The navy, on the other hand, refused to use force against TLP with its leader, stating, 'We can't apply pressure on our humans.' Instead, the navy

advised the government to deal with TLP. As a result, the sit-in ended with an army-brokered deal between the government and the TLP that guaranteed the retirement of the law minister and the reversal of the ostensible change. All TLP-related cases have also been dropped, and the arrested workers have been released. Later, then-Director General of the Punjab Rangers, Azhar Navid Hayat, was spotted handing out coin-filled envelopes to demonstrators. In its specific judgement on the Faizabad sit-in suo moto case, the Supreme Court indicted elite security groups for their clandestine assistance to TLP. "The armed forces, and all agencies manned by defense force employees, including ISI, Naval Intelligence (MI), and ISPR, serve Pakistan, and thus all its inhabitants," the judgement states. They should never be used to support a certain celebration, faction, or flesh presser."

ENTRY INTO POLITICAL ARENA

With the success of the Faizabad sit-in and an outstanding performance in the by-election in Lahore, a seat vacated by the disqualification of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the TLP registered as a political celebration while retaining its man or woman as a motion and contested the 2018 elections. Despite failing to win key seats, the TLP received 2.2 million votes, making it Pakistan's fifth largest and Punjab's third largest political party. Unlike the JUP, which united with the MMA, the TLP did not form an electoral partnership with any political birthday party in order to limit its logo of Brelvi politics solely in a sectarian framework. TLP's success in attracting covert help from all areas of Pakistani society was due to two primary elements. First, the state is looking for Sufi corporations to counter the timeframe of TLP's violent acts (2011-18). Following the purple Mosque revolt in Islamabad and the APS assault in Peshawar, Deobandi militant organizations emerged. TLP, along with a number of other firms, fell under this category. Second, the TLP benefited from the schisms between the PMLN government and the 'deep country.' The Navy's endeavor to set up independent spiritual entities in order to weaken PMLN authorities allowed the TLP to obtain additional political space. Prior to TLP, Pakistan deployed PAT's Tahir-ul-Qadri to exert pressure on the PMLN government. In the run-up to the 2018 elections, the PMLN partnered with JUIF, the navy's former Deobandi proxy institution, as an electoral ally. In the background, the PMLN also backed efforts to unite Maulana Ibtisam Elahi Zaheer's Jami at Ahl-e-Hadith Pakistan and Professor Sajid Mir's Markazi Jami at Ahl-e-Hadith to solidify the Salafi vote. This was in contrast to the navy's attempt to support the more extremist and harsher Milli Muslim League (MML), a political faction of Hafiz Saeed's Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JUD) that acted as an anti-PMLN organization. Nawaz Sharif, according to JUD, is soft on India and vicious on India-focused extremist organizations.

CHARISMATIC MANAGEMENT

Rizvi, who comes from a lower-middle-class Punjabi background, has gained a reputation among his supporters as a dynamic leader. He is an outstanding public speaker and a crowd pleaser. He immediately interacts with his followers and immediately leads them to rallies and agitations. Rizvi's use of Punjabi colloquialism, occasionally tinged with slang, has made him (in)famous among Punjab and Sindh's centre and decrease-center-elegance guiding base. Rizvi's admirers connect with him because of his socioeconomic history and ease of accessible. His admirers refer to him as Baba Ji (The Sage), while his followers refer to him as Ustad Ji (the Erudite

Trainer). Rizvi's political perceptions were altered by the success of the 2017 Faizabad sit-in.

He dispelled the idea that Brelvis were just good for 'shrine going' and 'halwa eating,' with little to no ability to participate in mainstream politics. 'Brelvis had been subjected to persecution for over a century, and the reverse phenomenon has begun,' Rizvi declared in his announcement following the 2017 Faizabad sit-in. Although it will take time, the majority of the people's voice will eventually triumph.' Rizvi has successfully converted his support network into a cohesive Brelvi vote bank by crafting an appealing political narrative. This distinguishes him from his contemporaries, who include Riaz Hussain Shah of the Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnah (JAS), Anas Noorani of the JUP-N, and Sahibzada Hamid Raza of the Sunni Etihad Council (SIC). In contrast to them, Rizvi has offered Brelvis with a story that has connected with them, has emotionally appealed to them, and has provided them with a viable political platform. As stated in the framework, tales must be emotionally engaging, entertaining, and offer a solution. Rizvi has provided salvation to his supporters and the larger Brelvi community in the fight to safeguard the Prophet Muhammad's holiness by fighting any changes to blasphemy laws and the installation of Nizam-e-Mustafa.

SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUE

TLP has successfully used social media sites like as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter to broaden its guide-base and spread its ideological discourse. Rizvi's videos became viral on social media during the two-sit down-ins in 2017 and 2018. Rizvi's lectures and speeches are available to thousands of TLP followers on social media; some are merely spiritual, while others articulate his political worldview. The internet has enabled TLP to enter and grow in areas of society where its networks of mosques and madrassas do not have access. While the majority of TLP's fans are from the labour and running-elegance, social media has won a few pockets of support among educated, urban beauty as well. Those supporters are fueling the party's social media efforts. While mainstream media blacked out coverage of TLP protests and sit-ins in 2017 and 2018, the birthday celebration effectively used social media platforms to mobilise its followers across Pakistan. The rate at which the TLP shuttered Pakistan's major cities (Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi) and blocked the most significant highways, combined with the media blackout, demonstrates how the TLP has mastered the use of social media as an alternative medium.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The research paper is an attempt to logically explore the role of TLP in Pakistani politics. The discussion of TLP function in Pakistani politics can be a theoretical sample of research, while the emergence of TLP in Pakistan can be a historical sample of research. The requirement sample and component of TLP in Pakistan is the most significant and key place of studies.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The role of TLP in Pakistani politics is an important subject of research. TLP roles are growing more prevalent with the passage of time, attracting the attention of scholars in recent years. Being the primary position in religious terms has become especially crucial because non-secular parties have outstanding public relations. The TLP's place in Pakistani politics is crucial. It is significantly more difficult for the

researcher to gain a true picture of politics without a detailed examination of the issue. TLP's place in Pakistani politics could be critical in the future. Now, an attempt is being made to comprehend and recognize Pakistan's current political condition. The role of TLP has become even more important in terms of ethnicity. The fundamental goal of these research is to comprehend the genuine picture of the TLP's role in politics in relation to sectarianism. These studies have the following objectives and goals.

MAIN OBJECTIVE

To examine the role of TLP in politics of the Pakistan

SUB-OBJECTIVES

- *To recognize the emergence of TLP*
- *To discover what volume TLP played her position in Pakistan's politics*
- *To probe what are the impacts of TLP politics in Pakistan*

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- *What is emergence goal of TLP?*
- *What extent TLP played her element in Pakistan's politics?*
- *What is the effect of TLP role on Pakistan's politics?*

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY

In this study, the religious political group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) is used as a case study to discuss its role in Pakistani politics using journals, papers, books and interviews as the research approach. To evaluate and analyze the given collection of data, the separate statistical procedures correlation and graphical analysis are applied. The graphical analysis is a useful evaluation in which the goal is to discover a pattern of statistical values with respect to time. The correlation analysis is used to calculate the energy of linear relationship between two variables.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Restrained research were performed approximately Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) from different aspects (Basit Abdul 2020). that is a lively article about Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP). to start with author stated that Tehreek-e-Labaik belong to Brelvi movement and Brelvi sect of Islam. He mentioned the records of TLP. Brelvi motion seemed inside the Sub-Continent in nineteenth century inside the reply of the reformist of Deoband and Ahl-e-Hadith movements. Brelvi motion at the name its founder Ahmad Raza Khan Brelvi. its miles stated Ahl-e-Sunnah Wal Jamaat (Adherents of the Sunnah and community) and hyperlink with Hanafi school of idea and Sunni branch of Islam. The core ideals of the Brelvi motion are Prophet Muhammad's primordial life before his delivery, his creation from God's mild (Nur), his simultaneous presence in multiple locations (Hazer-o-Nazir) and understanding of the unseen (Elm-e-Ghaib). Brelvis additionally placed emphasis on veneration of Sufi saints, their devotional practices and shrine worship. furthermore, they have fun Prophet Muhammad's birthday (Milad) and look at the dying anniversaries (Urs) of Sufi saints, whom they consider as intercession of God). due to these motives Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith label them as innovators (Bidaati). Then he mentioned the evolution of TLP from Brelvi politics to TLP in Pakistan. The Brelvi motion is composed fifty per cent of Pakistan population. Brelvi supported the separation of Sub-Continent and performed function in advent of Pakistan. In Zia technology Brelvi sect stay in-active in Afghan Jihad. In November 2017 TLP blocked Rawalpindi

Islamabad dual carriageway over the changes in oath-wording via Parliamentarians and the electorate. In election bill 2017, the wording of the oath was changed from "I solemnly swear to claim." even though this modification turned into reversed, TLP nonetheless demanded the resignation of the law Minister Zahid Hamid. There are also blamed that TLP became used in opposition to Pakistan Muslim League through army. within the widespread election 2018, Tahreek-e-Labaik Pakistan entered in politics. birthday party did no longer make any alliance with any religious birthday party. as the election end result TLP seemed as 5th biggest political celebration in Pakistan and 1/3 in Punjab with 2.2 million voters.

(Javid Hassan, 2021) written an active studying about Tahreek-e-Labaik Pakistan. He defined that TLP turn out to be a main religious political party in Pakistan. TLP have clean and country forward time table approximately the Prophet Hood of Holy Prophet. TLP considered everlasting risk for the hobby of secular organization in Pakistan. TLP is essentially a Brelvi motion whose simple intention is to campaign over the purpose difficulty of blasphemy in specially after the arrest of Mumtaz Qadri over the homicide prices of the former Governor of Punjab Salman Taseer in 2011. Taseer changed into accused of talking towards the Pakistan blasphemy regulation and help of Asia Bibi. concerning the speedy upward thrust of TLP in Pakistan the author stated. The blasphemy law in Pakistan remained a main issue in united states in shape of Anti-Ahmadiyya motion in 1953 and 2nd constitution amendment 1974 to declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims. the issue of Khatim-i-Nabuwat in 2011 led toward the murder of former Punjab Governor Salman Taseer. TLP was an best non secular political party who a hit tackle the issue the Khatim-i-Nabuwat. all of the manifesto TLP revolves around the finality of Prophet Hood. The second explanation for the upward thrust of TLP can be located how the politicization of Khatim-i-Nabuwat additionally represents a deliberate move with the aid of Brelvi group to counter the growing influence and indeed that have traditionally the beneficiaries of each country patronage and overseas investment in Pakistan. Following the good judgment of this argument, the enlargement of Deobandi strength and affect in Pakistan, notwithstanding the presence of Brelvi majority within the populace can be attributed to the navy status quo's active protection of militant Deobandi group and their associated seminaries as strategic assets to be deployed for the pursuit of strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The 0.33 explanation of TLP in Pakistan turned into because of the persona of Khadim Hussain Rizvi whose colloquial oratorical style & populist rhetoric, often couched in terms of anti-elitism, arguably appealed to people dissatisfied with the political reputation. The TLP used interest platform like twitter, fb and WhatsApp it messages to acquire its fans that allows you to pressurize government.

(Ahmad Arslan & Bilal Zafar Ranjha, 2020) is a great studying have one-of-a-kind dimensions of Sufism, upward push of Ahl-e-Hadith, Deoband and upward thrust and evolution of Tahreek-e-Labaik Pakistan. In Sub-continent Sufism supply current fashion to Islam. Sufism accommodated multi-thoughts in society. After the war of independence Muslim Ulemas began to refine Muslim society and interpreted the lessons of Quran and Sunnah and laid strain on adherence to the Sharia. these reformist ideas after translated into motion as Ahl-e-Hadith and Deoband in Sub-Continent. In 19th Century witnessed the rise of new sect of Sunnis the Brelvis as the

end result of a tension between revivalists. This institution changed into led via Ahmad Raza Khan Bareilvi criticized the Sufism and known as it an intrinsic a part of Islam. After the loss of life of Ahmad Raza Khan Bareilvi, Bareilvi's founded a platform called All India Sunni conference to boom their affect in India Sunni conference. All India Sunni convention supported the advent of Pakistan. Ayyub's martial regulation is an try to establish the writ of the kingdom introduced all the shrines beneath kingdom control through a brand new branch of Auqaf. This act compelled pirs to just accept the modernized model of Sufism. This was considered contradiction to the definition of Bareilvi Ulemas. Then Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto redefined state official narrative on socialist line. This become also contradict to the Bareilvi teachings. Musharraf enlightened moderation added the Bareilvi scholars into mean stream for the primary time in Pakistan records.

established order of the Auqaf department delivered pirs underneath the country patronage. The cause turned into to changing the definition of Sufism and at the same time as assisting to Deoband Ulemas to alienate Bareilvi Sufi Ulemas in Pakistan. until 1970's JUP changed into now not an effective political pressure even as Deoband alternatively had a substantial have an impact on between the state and society. Zia's Islamization and patronization of the Deobandis by means of the nation cracked the JUP, which alienated Bareilvi and they lost political relevance. Deobandi's growing influence within the nation equipment, forceful occupation of Bareilvi mosques in all over the United States of America and regardless of having majority of fans least political representation in politics, left no different choice for Bareilvi to take hands in hand and start violent struggle for the protection of their rights. This caused the upward thrust of a militant institution Sunni Tehreek beneath the leadership of Saleem Qadri in 1990.

Saleem Qadri mounted Dawat-e-Islami and inspired the Bareilvi adolescents in Pakistan. In 1997 Dawat-e-Islami got prominent function in USA. In 2001 Saleem Qadri was assassinated and 2d later Abass Qadri took the leadership of celebration. In 2009 Aisha Maseeh case and killing Salman Taseer 2011 engaged Bareilvi in militant sports. They raised the slogan of Namooos-e-Risalat (Prophet's Honor) and Ishq-e-Rasool (Love for the Prophet Muhammad). This increased their street power and that they hijacked and challenged the writ of the kingdom. The person at the prices of Salman Taseer known as Mumtaz Qadri Bareilvi offered him the titles of Ghazi-e-Millat, Muhafiz-e-Millat-e-Islamia and hero of Islam. This marks the rise of recent are of spiritual intolerance in Pakistan in which Bareilvi commenced glorifying and cherishing folks who killed within the call of the Prophet. The Ulema who had been taking active part inside the procedure of hailing the assassin because the protector of Prophet's honor Khadim Hussain Rizvi unabashedly stands at pinnacle. He was one of the Bareilvi spiritual clerics who made to headlines whilst a movement was launched to revert the court orders to execute Mumtaz Qadri. Khadim Hussain Rizvi was an ex- government appoint (Imam Masjid) in the branch of Auqaf (Lahore) and resigned from the job after this incident. He actively participated within the 'Ghazi Bachao Tehreek and make it to the top tier of leadership of this movement due to his fiery oratory skills in the indigenous language. at some stage in the time of Ghazi Bachao Tehreek Bareilvi Ulemas monopolized the perception Ishq-e-Rasool and kept it alive underneath the guise of Namooos-e-Rasalat. Poster boys for his or her motion are the

who took nation's regulation in their palms and killed a person on the suspicion of blasphemous activities which includes Mumtaz Qadri, Tanveer Ahmed (the only who killed an Ahmadi in Glasgow) and murderers of Mashaal Khan. Tahreek-e-Labaik Pakistan is taken into consideration the essential spiritual political party in us of a. Finality of Holy Prophet is taken into consideration the principle points of Tahreek-e-Labaik Pakistan. The main focus on this topic as per previous research findings was on historical background and introduction instead of role of TLP in politics.

CONCLUSION

This paper has studied TLP's hybrid birthday celebration-movement structure. In doing so, it has illustrated that TLP's evolution is constant with different non-secular-political agencies in Pakistan. However, its narrow and exclusionary politics and activism makes it precise. TLP's political activism has increased the existing sectarian variations in Pakistan from Sunni-Shia warfare to intra-Sunni dispute as nicely. The use of social media, TLP has exploited the Bareilvi community's decrease-center-magnificence youth through allotting a belligerent and adverse worldview of Islam to them. This can have long-term implications on Pakistan's spiritual politics, in standard, and Bareilvi politics, specifically. The most apparent one being the non-stop susceptibility of the prone young people to sectarian interpretations of Islam. Surely, Islam performs a sizeable position in public and private spheres in Pakistan. However, the unsettled debate on nationalism, whether Pakistan is a Muslim or an Islamic state, has created an identification crisis many of the teenagers. During Pakistan's records, the state's coverage of appeasing the religious organizations has most effectively recommended them and helped them to extend their impact on the detriment of the Former. Likewise, the idea of mainstreaming non-secular tough-liner businesses into politics to deter violence and encourage moderation need to be re-taken into consideration. Reduction has to be a pre-needful for political mainstreaming, now not an outcome.



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

References

1. Allamah Khadim Hussain Rizvi Official. (2017, June 20). Talking about Hindu for Islam [Video]. YouTube.
2. Allamah Khadim Hussain Rizvi Official. (2020, May 1). Allamah Khadim Hussain Rizvi 2020 Aqliyat Commission Ke Naam Par Qadiyani Nawaaz.
3. Allamah Khadim Hussain Rizvi Official. (2020, July 3). Message for Temple Builders Temple in Islamabad
4. Adil, Muhammad, and Dr Sardar Muhammad Saad Jaffar. "Role Of Religious Parties In Legislation In Parliament Of Pakistan (2013-18): A Critical Analysis." *Webology* 18, no. 5 (2021): 1890-1900.
5. Barvi Media 92 & Movies Production. (2017, March 5). Allamah Hafiz Khadim Husain Rizvi new bayan 2017-Deobandi mazhab ki haqeeqat [Video]. YouTube.

6. Basit, A. (2020). *Brelvi Political Activism and Religious Mobilization in Pakistan: The Case of Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP)*. *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 21(3), 374-389.
7. *Dajjal - The Anti-Christ*. (2018, October 31). Pir Afzal Qadri, Khadim Rizvi talking about Army, Judiciary and Imran Khan. [Video]. YouTube.
8. Farooq, U. (2018). *TLP, social media and hate speech in Pakistan*. Centre for Research & Security Studies. (n.d).
9. Hafiz Hamza. (2016, May 20). Khadim Rizvi Abusing on Dr Tahir Ul Qadri in Mosque. [Video]. YouTube.
10. Hussain, Z. (2017, October 18). *The politics of hate*. Dawn.
11. Haider, I. (2018). *The rise of the new cleric in Pakistan*:235-248
12. *In Khabar*. (2019, December 3). Khadim Hussain Rizvi abused Sikh, Maharaja Ranjeet Singh [Video]. YouTube.
13. Karen, S. (2005). *News narratives and news framing: Constructing political reality*. (n.d) Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.:392-401
14. Khan, A. (2020, August 19). *Her American father was shot in a blasphemy trial in Pakistan*.
15. Khan, Muhammad Bahar, Dr Imran Naseem Saad Jaffar, Muhammad Waseem Mukhtar, and Waqar Ahmed. "Nature Of 21st Century's Global Conflicts Under The Global Powers' Geoeconomic Strategies And Islamic Ideology For Peace." *Journal of Positive School Psychology* (2023): 1291-1298.